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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
In instructing the jury, the district court deviated from the pattern
instructions for battery on law enforcement and failed to instruct the jury that the
officer must have been discharging his lawful duties at the time the battery
occurred. The jury instructions also allowed the jury to find Mr. Padgett guilty even
if it concluded that his open-handed slaps constituted unlawful touching or striking.
Because defense counsel did not object to the district court’s instruction, the error
must be reviewed under the fundamental error doctrine articulated in State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010). As explained in Mr. Padgett’s opening
brief, the jury instructions violated Mr. Padgett’s constitutional right to due process,
the error was plain and the error affected Mr. Padgett’s substantial rights.
In response, the state claims there is a distinction between a party’s failure to
object by silence and a party’s failure to object by informing the court that the party
has no objection. The state then classifies the latter circumstance as an “affirmative
waiver of objections” and argues this “affirmative waiver” invokes the invited error
doctrine, bars review under Idaho Criminal Rule 30(b)(3) and prevents Mr. Padgett
from showing a violation of an “unwaived” constitutional right and plain error. The
state conflates failure to preserve an issue with an affirmative waiver and its
arguments are unsupported by authority. For the reasons set forth below and in his
opening brief, this Court should vacate Mr. Padgett’s judgment of conviction.
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A.

The Invited Error Doctrine Does Not Apply
The state claims that defense counsel “invited” the district court to

erroneously instruct the jury because he indicated on the record that he did not
object to the jury instructions at the jury instruction conference. This argument is
without merit.
The invited error doctrine applies when a party caused or played an
important role in prompting a trial court to give or not give a jury instruction. State
v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117, 120 (1999); State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho
389, 402, 3 P.3d 67, 80 (Ct. App. 2000). Invited error applies to conduct beyond
“mere failure to object,” such as when the attorney affirms the correctness of the
trial court’s decision. State v. Wilkerson, 121 Idaho 345, 349, 824 P.2d 920, 924 (Ct.
App. 1992). For instance, courts have found invited error when the defendant
objected to an action and then raised the district court’s failure to take that action
on appeal. See State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 915, 265 P.3d 519, 528 (Ct. App.
2011) (by filing motion in limine seeking to limit testimony of his other crimes,
wrongs or acts, the defendant himself prevented evidence from coming in); State v.
Bagshaw, 137 Idaho 613, 617, 51 P.3d 427, 431 (Ct. App. 2002) (defendant may not
successfully complain that the trial court failed to take an action to which defendant
vigorously objected).
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Here, Mr. Padgett neither caused nor prompted the district court to deviate
from the pattern instructions, omit an element of the offense and utilize the general
battery instruction in a way that risked the jury finding him guilty for crime with
which he was not accused. To the contrary, in his proposed instructions, Mr.
Padgett asked the district court to instruct the jury that “at the time of the offense,
[the officer] was a police officer,” that “the offense was committed while [the officer]
was engaged in the performance of his duties,” that “the defendant knew or
reasonably should have known that [the officer] was a police officer, and “the
battery was not committed by intentional and unlawful touching or striking of a
person against the will of that person.” R. 82-83. The district court declined to
utilize Mr. Padgett’s requested instructions.
Nor does the authority cited by the state support its suggestion that a party’s
indication that he or she has no objection to a jury instruction constitutes invited
error. Cf Respondent’s Brief, p. 4-5 with State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 187, 254 P.
3d 77, 88 (Ct. App. 2011) (party stipulated to the admission of the interrogation
transcript objected to on appeal); State v. Lee, 131 Idaho 600, 605, 961 P.2d 1203,
1208 (Ct. App. 1998) (no invited error in district court's continuing to poll jury,
which had effect of singling out one juror as lone dissenting juror, and then ordering
jury to continue its deliberations, when defense counsel questioned this juror
regarding her problem with verdict, where defendant did not claim that district
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court's actions in inviting defense counsel to question juror constituted error); State
v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 821, 864 P.2d 654, 659 (Ct. App. 1993) (misstep in
witness examination on dangerous ground on which counsel has voluntarily
ventured but is unsure of possible responses, may result in invited error); State v.
Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985) (defendant’s counsel elicited
the testimony to which he objected on appeal).
The state also cites to Blake, which undermines rather than support its
position. Respondent’s Brief, p. 4. There, the defendant’s counsel informed the
district court that he concurred with the district court’s instruction and had
“nothing to say on the record at this time.” Blake, 133 Idaho at 240, 985 P.2d at 120.
The Court ruled that counsel’s concurrence did not invite the court to give the
challenged instructions and, instead, the judge had already decided to give the
instruction and counsel declined the opportunity to object on the record. Blake, 133
Idaho at 240, 985 P.2d at 120; see also State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 499, 198
P.3d 128, 137 (Ct. App. 2008) (although defendant did not object to the questioning,
his failure to object did not induce error by the prosecutor).
Here, defense counsel played no role in the district court’s decision to deviate
from ICJI, omit an element of the offense and use the general battery instruction in
a way that risked the jury convicting Mr. Padgett for an unlawful touching or
striking. Rather, defense counsel failed to object to the instructions the district
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court had already decided to use, thereby failing to properly preserve the issue for
appeal.
B.

Failure to Comply with Idaho Criminal Rule 30(b)(3) Does Not
Preclude Review Under the Fundamental Error Doctrine
The state claims that the jury instruction errors can not be reviewed for

fundamental error because Mr. Padgett did not preserve the issues for review by
complying with Idaho Criminal Rule 30(b)(3). Rule 30(b)(3) provides that “no party
may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction unless the party
objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the
instruction to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection.” Thus, Rule
30(b)(3) describes what is necessary to properly preserve an objection for appeal and
non compliance does not procedurally bar review under the fundamental error
doctrine.
The state admits as much, citing to State v. Hall, 161 Idaho 413, 422, 387 P.
3d 81, 90 (2016) where the Court reviewed the failure to give an instruction under
the fundamental error doctrine after concluding the defendant did not comply with
Rule 30(b)(3). The state attempts to distinguish Hall by relying on its new subclass
of failing to object, which it characterizes as “the affirmative waiver of objections in
the course of a jury instruction conference.” The state’s characterization lacks
support in case law.
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Indeed, the procedural history in Hall is indistinguishable from this case
(and incidentally involves the same trial attorney). There, trial counsel submitted
proposed instructions that included all elements of the offense and requested
additional instructions. During the final jury instruction conference, the district
court inquired whether either party had any objections or “other proposed
instructions” or “corrections or objections or additions to the final instructions,” to
which defense counsel replied: “no, your Honor.” Hall, 161 Idaho at 422, 387 P.3d at
90. The Defendant then challenged jury instructions on appeal. After determining
the issue was not adequately preserved under Rule 30(b), the Court reviewed the
jury instructions under the fundamental error doctrine.
The instant case is indistinguishable. In both cases, trial counsel submitted
proposed instructions but informed the district court that he did not object to the
final instructions. Because Mr. Padgett’s counsel failed to preserve the jury
instruction error for review, it must be reviewed under the fundamental error
doctrine.
C.

Mr. Padgett Established Fundamental Error
1.

Mr. Padgett did not waive his due process right that the jury
be instructed on every element of the offense and that he not
be convicted of crime with which he was not charged

A defendant does not waive his due process right for the jury to be instructed
on every element of the offense for purposes of the first Perry prong by failing to
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object to a defective instruction. See State v. Sutton, 151 Idaho 161, 166, 254 P.3d
62, 67 (Ct. App. 2011) (defendant who failed to object to jury instruction that
omitted element of the offense demonstrated violation of an unwaived constitutional
right). However, the state again attempts to characterize Mr. Padgett’s indication
he had no objection as a specific waiver of “any claim of alleged errors in the
instructions.” The state cites no authority that supports this distinction and
appellate cases have not distinguished between failing to object by indicating “no
objection” during a jury instruction conference and failing to object by remaining
silent after a witness testifies to objectionable material.
2.

Plain error

The state claims that Mr. Padgett cannot establish “plain error” because
“counsel elected to affirmatively waive any objection to the instructions, a facially
tactical decision.” Respondent’s Brief, p. 6. However, the record does not reflect that
Mr. Padgett’s attorney was aware the instructions omitted an element or recognized
the danger presented by battery definition instruction. See also State v. Sutton, 151
Idaho 161, 166, 254 P.3d 62, 67 (Ct. App. 2011) (no indication in the record that
defendant knew any more about the law than the State or the trial court, nor is
there any evidence or indication that defense counsel was attempting to sandbag
the court).
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Nor is there any conceivable tactical advantage in relieving the state of its
burden to prove an element of the offense. And permitting the jury to find Mr.
Padgett guilty for unlawfully striking or touching the officer undercut defense
counsel’s argument that Mr. Padgett resisted but did not batter the officer. There is
not evidence trial counsel’s decision was tactical and the error in the jury
instructions is plain.
3.

The errors affected Mr. Padgett’s substantial rights

The elements instruction relieved the state from proving the officer was
engaged in the performance of his duties. Most of the testimony regarding Mr.
Padgett’s defensive actions in slapping away the officer could have easily been
construed as “touching” or “striking” instead of the use of force or violence. Had the
jury been fully and correctly instructed, the outcome of the trial would have been
different.
In response, the state argues “the evidence that Padgett used force and
violence on the officer while he was engaged in official duties was overwhelming.”
Respondent’s Brief, p. 6. However, according to the officer’s testimony, Mr. Padgett
twisted away and slapped at the officer’s hands and arms in an attempt to remove
the officer’s hands from his person and prevent him from forcibly removing him
from the vehicle. Id. at p. 175, ln. 7-24; p. 176, ln. 20- p. 177, ln. 13.
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The jury was informed that Mr. Padgett was accused of battery on a police
officer by “willfully and unlawfully use[ing] force and/or violence upon the person of
[the officer] by striking the officer in the arm and/ or upper body, where the
Defendant knew or had reason to know that [the officer] was a police officer and did
commit said battery while [the officer] was engaged in the performance of his
duties.” The jury was instructed to find Mr. Padgett guilty of the battery if it
concluded he committed a “battery” on the officer by “willfully and unlawfully using
force and or violence.” Immediately following the elements instruction on the same
page, the jury was instructed that a battery occurs when a person “actually,
intentionally and unlawfully touches or strikes another person against the will of
the other.”
The jury could have easily found that Mr. Padgett’s attempts to resist the
officers by slapping with an open hand and twisting away constituted an unlawful
touching or striking. The jury instructions equated force or violence with an
unlawful touching or striking rather clarify that “force” or “violence” necessarily
involves something more than “touching” or “striking.” The jury instructions
thereby created a grave risk that Mr. Padgett was convicted of a crime other than
that which he was charged in violation of due process as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 13 of the

9

Idaho Constitution. See State v. Sherrod, 131 Idaho 56, 60, 951 P.2d 1283, 1287 (Ct.
App. 1998); State v. Cariaga, 95 Idaho 900, 902, 523 P.2d 32, 34 (1974)
The state also argues that Mr. Padgett was not harmed by the failure to
instruct the jury that the officer must have been lawfully discharging his duties
because the jury specifically found the officers were engaged in their official duties
in relation to the resist or obstruct count. Respondent’s Brief, p. 7. Defense counsel
conceded that Mr. Padgett resisted and obstructed the officers and it is unlikely the
jury gave the element any thought.
Mr. Padgett acknowledges that his attorney’s failure to claim self-defense
against unreasonable force at trial is an issue for post-conviction. Nevertheless, the
facts supported that the officer’s force was excessive. Indeed, the officer testified
that he had been trained that the use of force must be reasonable under the
circumstances and under the resistance or the force that's being perpetrated against
you. Tr. p. 178, ln. 2-10 (emphasis added). It is undisputed that the officers punched
Mr. Padgett with a closed first several times in response to Mr. Padgett’s openhanded defensive moves. The officer’s own testimony established that he used more
force than Mr. Padgett in order to gain compliance and thus his force was excessive
under the officer’s own understanding of the policy.
Notwithstanding lingering issues regarding trial counsel’s effectiveness, the
record establishes that the district court committed fundamental error by deviating
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from the ICJI, omitting an element of the offense from the elements instruction and
creating a substantial risk that Mr. Padgett could be found guilty of battery for
unlawfully striking or touching the officer. While trial counsel’s shortcomings
undoubtedly further impacted the verdict, the district court’s errors in instructing
the jury were substantial and changed the trial’s outcome.
III. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons stated above and in Mr. Padgett’s opening brief, the
district court’s error in the instructing the jury violated Mr. Padgett’s unwaived
constitutional rights, was plain and affected his substantial rights. According, Mr.
Padgett asks the Court to vacate his judgment of conviction for battery on a police
officer.
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of April 2018
FYFFE LAW

/s/ Robyn Fyffe
ROBYN FYFFE
Attorney for Dean Padgett
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